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BOOK REVIEW

ON LAW AND TRUTH
George A. Martine*
I.

INTRODUcrION

The adversarial system often yields a clear result-one side wins
and the other side loses. What remains unclear is whether the court
has actually arrived at the truth in obtaining its result. Perhaps, given
a clear result, one would think that the law does not require a theory
of truth. Dennis Patterson, however, recognizes the importance of a
theory of truth for the law. In his new book, Law and Truth,' Patterson
argues that the very task ofjurisprudence is to provide a philosophical
account of what it means to say that propositions of law are true or
false.
Law and Truth engages a centuries-old philosophical debate over
the notion of truth.2 Patterson links his project to the more general
philosophical debate over realism versus antirealism.3 Following Ronald Dworkin, he connects jurisprudence directly with the philosophy
of language. 4 He characterizes Dworkin as advocating a version of re* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, BA. Arizona State
University 1976; MA. (Philosophy) The University of Michigan 1979; J.D. Harvard
Law School 1985. I would like to thank Professors Dennis Patterson and John
Robinson for reviewing and commenting on a draft of this article.
1 DENNIS PATrERSON, LAw AND TRuTH (1996).

2

See id. at 4; see also TRUTH I (George Pitcher ed., 1964). See generally RICHARD L.

KMRKn-IAM, THEORIES OF TRUTH (1992).

3

PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 5. For more on realism versus antirealism, see

MICHAEL DEvrrr, REALSM AND TRuTH (2d ed. 1991); HI.ARY PUTNAM, REALISM AND
REASON (1983); RICHARD RoRTY, OBJEcrwV-Y, RELATIVISM AND TRuTH (1991).
4 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 8; see also Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to THE

PHnOSOPY OF LAW 1 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977). Dworkin writes "[e]ven the debate about the nature of law, which has dominated legal philosophy for some decades, is, at bottom, a debate within the philosophy of language and metaphysics." Id.
at 1.
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alism, 5 and he understands Dworkin to argue that truth in law requires a truth independent of the belief or agreement that a
proposition is true. 6 What motivates realism? Patterson suggests that
one motivation is the belief that there is some fact of the matter about
legal propositions 7-we want our discourse on law to be true.8 Realists are not satisfied with the antirealist account of truth. For antirealists, "true" means the satisfaction of intersubjective criteria,9 while for
the realist, the truth must be something more than the fact that with
respect to some proposition of law, everyone believes the proposition
to be true. 10 What some realists want-Patterson calls them metaphysical realists-is an account of truth in which the meaning of "is true" is
given by the correspondence of some sentences to a state of affairs
independent of convention and one's mind." For the realist, legal
discourse must reflect the way things in fact are.12 Thus, the world
makes a contribution to our knowledge. 13 Language is the vehicle for
5 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
6 Id. at 8; see also MICHAEL A.E. DUMMETr, TRuTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS (1978).
Dummett characterizes "realism" as the belief that statements-for example, statements about the physical world or mental events-possess an objective truth value,
independently of our means of knowing it. Id. at 146. Such statements are true or
false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us. Id.
7 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
8 Id.
9 Id. In contrast to realism, the antirealist contends that statements are to be
understood only by reference to the sort of thing which we count as evidence for such
a statement. See DUMMETT, supranote 6, at 146. The realist, on the other hand, takes
the position that the meaning of statements is not directly tied to the kind of evidence
for them that we can have, but consists in the manner of their determination as true
or false by states of affairs whose existence is not dependent on our possession of
evidence for them. Id. The antirealist, however, argues that the meanings of statements are tied directly to what we count as evidence for them such that a statement, if
true at all, can be true only in virtue of something of which we could know and which
we should count as evidence for its truth. Id.; see also RoRTY, supra note 3. "The term
'antirealism' was first put in circulation by Michael Dummett .... " Id. at 3.
10 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
11 Id. at 8-9; see alsoJ.E. MALPAS, DONALD DAVIDSON AND THE MIRROR OF MEANING
(1992). Malpas suggests that realism comprises three distinct theses:
an independence thesis according to which the existence of the world or the
objects which make up the world is independent of anything mental; a uniqueness thesis which states that there is one, and only one, true and complete description of the world; and a thesis about truth, which sees truth as a
matter of correspondence between language and the world.
Id. at 231.

12

See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 9.

13

Id. at 10.
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this contribution, 14 and somehow language reflects the way things are
in the world.' 5 Thus, our use of language will be correct or incorrect
depending on the way the world is and not the way we believe it to
6
be.1
How does the world guide our linguistic usage? Here Patterson
observes a central problem for the realists: they must provide a way for
7
the world to act as a normative check on our linguistic practices.'
Patterson thinks that this is a problem for every version of realism: to
give an account of how the world-or conditions independent of evidence-constrains linguistic behavior.' 8
Patterson would have the law reach beyond realism and antirealism. 19 He contends that "true" does not name a relationship between
a state of affairs and a proposition of law.20 The truth of a proposition
of law is not a function of the relationship of the proposition to something that makes the proposition true. 21 Instead, the truth of a propo23
sition of law22 is shown through the use of forms of legal argument.
Independent conditions do not make legal assertions true, 24 and
truth, in the law, is neither a property nor a relation. 25 The forms of
14 Id.
15 Id.; see also TRUTH, supranote 2, at 4 (the correspondence theory of truth holds

that "truth is a relation-that of correspondence-between what is said or thought
and a fact or state of affairs in the world").
16 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 10; see also THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM
NOWHERE 91 (1986) (realism is the view that "the world is in a strong sense independent of our possible representations, and may well extend beyond them").
17 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 11.
18 Id. at 11; see also John McDowell, Projection and Truth in Ethics, The Lindley
Lecture, University of Kansas, Department of Philosophy (Oct. 21, 1987). McDowell
says:
Surely if the history of philosophical reflection on the correspondence theory of truth has taught us anything, it is that there is ground for suspicion of
the idea that we have some way of telling what can count as a fact, prior to
and independent of asking what form of words might count as expressing
truths, so a conception of facts could exert some leverage in the investigation of truth.
Id. at 11.
19 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 19.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Patterson first developed this position in Dennis Patterson, Conscience and
the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 270 (1993).
24 See PATrTERSON, supra note 1, at 21.
25 Id.; see also WiuAM P. ALSrON, A R usT CONCEPTION OF TRUTH (1996). Alston discusses deflationary accounts of truth which hold that it is incorrect to believe
that there is a property of truth that one attributes to propositions. Id. at 41. On a
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legal argument are the means for appraising the truth of propositions
of law.

26

This Essay both explains and critiques Patterson's theory of truth.
Part II sets out Patterson's alternative account of truth in law, focusing
on the example of Philip Bobbitt. Part III explains Patterson's conception of postmodern jurisprudence and describes his typology,
which purports to show what it means for a proposition to be true as a
matter of law. Part IV evaluates Patterson's account of truth in law
and suggests that Patterson ultimately fails to dismantle realism. Part
V, in conclusion, offers the recent revival of realism in philosophy as a
new influence upon legal thought.
II.

TRUTH IN LAw

Patterson provides an alternative account of truth in law. He uses
constitutional argument as an example, and he finds the position of
Philip Bobbitt to be instructive.2 7 Bobbitt argues that the debate over
the legitimacy ofjudicial review is a pseudodebate.2 8 Bobbitt says that
the practice of constitutional law involves using six forms of argument-the modalities.2 9 The modalities show the truth of propositions of constitutional law.30 For Bobbitt, a legal decision is legitimate
to the extent that it follows the forms of argument recognized within
our legal structure-that is, the modalities. 31 The six forms of argument are:
1. Historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution);
2. Textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average
contemporary);
3. Structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up);
deflationary account, truth discourse that seems to involve property attribution is best
understood in some other way. Id.
26 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 21.
27 Id. at 128; see also PHILIP BoBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
For other discussions of Bobbitt, see George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteiniansand
the End of Jurisprudence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 545 (1996); T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional
Interpretation,52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 157 (1993); Gene R. Nichol, ConstitutionalJudgment,
91 MicH. L. REv. 1107 (1993).
28 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 129.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 129-30; see also Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEx. L.
REv. 1869, 1902 (1994) (law is a set of practices that are legitimated by following the
rules embodied in those practices).
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4. Doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent);
5. Ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the
American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and
6. Prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a partic2
ular rule).

The modalities are the ways that propositions of law are shown to
be true or false.38 Contrary to the received view injurisprudence, they
are not true by virtue of something independent of the modalities and
external to law as it is generally understood.3 4 Thus, jurisprudence
should be concerned only with describing internal modalities35
describing actual legal practice.
A judicial decision is justified if one of the six modalities is used
to reach the decision.3 6 Similarly, a legal decision is legitimate to the
extent that it remains within the modalities. 37 Appealing to matters
external to law to justify legal propositions is rejected not because externalist theory-such as philosophy, literary theory or economics-is
wrong, but because it is irrelevant. 38 Legitimacy in law is a function of
using the form of argument appropriate to the legal proposition at
issue.3 9 Thus, illegitimacy in justification results from the use of forms
of argument from one discourse to justify a proposition from another
discourse. 40 For these reasons, it is a mistake to justify propositions of
41
law with the justificatory tools of disciplines external to law.
III.

POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE

Patterson rejects the traditional modernist 42 answer to the question of what it means to say that a proposition of law is true. For the
32

See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 137 (numerals added).

33

Id.

34 Id.; see also Bobbitt, supranote 31, at 1902-03 ("In my view .... 'legitimacy is
not delivered to the law from outside"') (citing Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theoiy, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1837, 1838-39 (1994)).
35 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 137.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.; cf. Douglas Lind, ConstitutionalAdjudication as a Craft-Bound Excellence 6
YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 353 (1994). Lind argues that since external legal theorists-those
that believe that the truth of a legal proposition depends on something external to
law---e.g., philosophy or economics-base constitutional meaning on standards
which lie outside the practice of adjudication, they issue judgments of constitutional
right and wrong which are fundamentally irrelevant. Id. at 390.
39 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 149.
40 Id. at 148.
41 Id.
42 Modernism can be represented by three axes:
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modernist, truth names a relation between a proposition and some
state of affairs that makes the proposition true. 43 The postmodernist
rejects the project of discerning the connection between propositions
and what makes them true.44 For a postmodernist such as Patterson,
to say that a proposition is true is to say that "a sufficiently well-placed
speaker who used the words in that way would be fully warranted in
counting the statement as true of that situation."45 Thus, for Patterson a proposition of law is true if a competent legal actor could justify
its assertion. 46 To justify the assertion of the proposition, the legal
actor would have to employ the forms of legal argument. 47
Patterson attempts to overcome the realism versus antirealism debate, though these two positions represent the leading perspectives
over the question of what determines the truth of a proposition. 48 According to the realist account, a proposition is true in virtue of some
aspect of the world that makes it true. 49 On the other hand, the antirealist contends there are no features of the world that make propositions true or false. 50 Instead, truth or falsity is a function of
agreement among participants in a practice. 51 Some contend that the
realism versus antirealism debate can be side-stepped by viewing questions of truth from an antirepresentationalist standpoint.52 The thrust
(1) Epistemological Foundationalism: the view that knowledge can be justified to the extent that it rests on indubitable foundations; (2) Theory of
Language: language has one of two functions-it represents ideas or states

of affairs, or it expresses the attitudes of the speaker; (3) Individual and
Community: "society" is best understood as an aggregation of "social atoms."

Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 263 (1992)
(citing Nancey Murphy, Scientific Realism and Postmodern Philosophy, 41 BRrr. J. PHIL.
Sci. 291, 292 (1990)) (hereinafter Patterson, Postmodernism).
43 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 151.
44 Id.; see also Patterson, Postmodernism, supra note 42, at 272 ("postmodernist conceptions of the word-world relation see the modernist picture of propositional, representational truth as unintelligible-as a project that never gets off the ground").
45

See PATTERSON, supranote 1, at 151 (quoting

AND REALTY

46
47
48

HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION

115 (1988)).

Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 165; see also MICHAEL DEvrrr & KIM

STERELNY, LANGUAGE AND REALxrr- AN
INTRODUCrION TO THE PHIosoPHY OF LANGUAGE 187-88 (1993) (realism has tradition-

ally been opposed by idealism or antirealism).
49 See PATtERSON, supra note 1, at 165; see also DEvrrr & STERELNY, supra note 48,
at 191 ("A notion of truth is realist.., if it does not make the truth of a statement
dependent on the evidence we have or might have for the statement.").
50 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 165.
51 Id.
52

Id. at 166; see also RORTy, supra note 3, at 2 (antirepresentationalists think that

the controversies between realists and idealists are pointless).
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of antirepresentationalism is to reject the view of language as set apart
from and against reality. 53 The realists say that propositions refer to
54
things in the world, and these things make the proposition true.
The antirealist argues that there is nothing out there beyond our conventional determinations of truth and falsity.5 5 Both the realist and
the antirealist, however, believe that the meaning of propositions
comes from somewhere, 5 6 and they disagree only as to the source of
meaning. 57 The realist identifies the world as the source of meaning;
the antirealist contends that conventional criteria are the source of
meaning.58
Patterson contends that the work of the philosopher Hilary Putnam provides a way to avoid the realism versus antirealism debate. 59
According to Patterson, Putnam is an antirepresentationlist. 6 0 Putnam argues that a statement is true if a "sufficiently well-placed
speaker who used the words in that way would be fully warranted in
61
counting the statement as true of that situation."
Thus, the truth of statements is not the result of linguistic acts
and states of affairs. 62 Postmodernism produces a shift from the idea
of language as representation to language as practice-that is, meaning as use.6 3 In short, the postmodern view of language emphasizes
64
language as a social practice and not as a representational medium.
53 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 167; see also RORTY, supra note 3, at 2 ("antirepresentationalism" refers "to the attempt to eschew discussions of realism by denying the notion of 'representation,' or that of 'fact of the matter,' has any useful role in
philosophy").
54 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 167; see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION
AND LEGAL THEORY 86 (1992) ("A realist must maintain, with respect to a certain class
of statements, that there is a determinant reality rendering the statements in that class
either true or not true, independently of whether we can recognize or confirm this.").
55 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 167.
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also DEvrrr &

58
STERELNY, supra note 48, at 187 (Realists contend that
physical entities are "'independent' of and 'external' to the mind. They say that an
entity exists 'objectively' in that its existence does not depend on anyone's opinion;
nor does it arise from the imposition of our concepts or theories.").
59 See PATERSON, supranote 1, at 167; see also ALSTON, supra note 25, at 132. At
one time, Hilary Putnam was one of the leading defenders of realism. Id. In the midseventies, however, he became one of the leading critics of realism. Id.
60 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 167.
61 Id. at 168 (quoting HILARYPuTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALrm' 115 (1988)).
62 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 169.
63 Id.
64 Id at 170; see also Patterson, Postmodernism, supra note 42, at 273 ("the

postmodern alternative replaces the modernist picture of Sentence-Truth-World with

890
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Knowledge, for the postmodernist, becomes an ability which is shown
65
in linguistic practices.
Applying this antirepresentationalist view to propositions of law,
Patterson notes that claims of propositions in law are assertive in nature.6 6 For example, the claim that "Statute S is unconstitutional" asserts a purported truth. If one asks what it is about S which causes one
to assert that S is unconstitutional, one asks for the ground of the
claim. Suppose S provides the following requirement: "Any assembly
of twelve persons or more requires a parade permit." This fact is the
ground for the claim that S is unconstitutional. The ground is advanced in support of the claim. What connects the ground to the
claim? To inquire into how the ground is relevant to the claim is to
seek the warrant. The warrant is the connection between the ground
and the claim. In our example of statute S, the warrant is the First
Amendment. The First Amendment provides for the right to peaceable assembly. The First Amendment is the warrant which connects
the ground and the claim. 67 The warrant, however, must be used in
the right way. At this point, the forms of argument-the modalitiesare relevant. The forms of argument are the culturally endorsed
modes for the use of warrants. The forms of argument are the "back68
ings" for warrants.
How does this work? Suppose we have this claim or proposition
of law: "S is unconstitutional." The ground of the claim is the fact that
the ordinance contains a parade permit requirement. The First
Amendment warrants the move from the ground to the claim that "S
is unconstitutional." The backing for the warrant is the textual modality-that is, looking to the ordinary meaning of the language of the
69
First Amendment.
What if the backings for warrants-or the forms of argumentconflict? One needs a criterion for choosing among forms of argument in cases of conflict. 70 Here Patterson relies on the philosopher
71
W.V.O. Quine's metaphor of science as "a total field of force."
Quine suggested that it was incorrect to talk about the empirical conan account of understanding that emphasizes practice, warranted assertability, and
pragmatism").
65
66

See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 171.
Id. at 170.

67 Id.
68

Id. at 171.

69
70

Id.
Id.

71

Id. at 172; see also WILAnRD V.0. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in
20 (2d ed. 1953). Quine writes:

LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw

FROM A
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tent of an individual statement.7 2 Similarly, in legal discourse, it is
misleading to talk about the truth of a statement of law in isolation
from other propositions within the legal web of belief.73 In selecting
among different interpretations, choose those that clash least with
everything we take to be true. 74 In law, we are to select the proposition that best meshes with the truth of other legal propositions. 75
In moving from ground to claim or legal proposition, then, lawyers use the forms of argument, or the modalities, to show the truth of
legal propositions.7 6 Patterson's typology purports to show what it
77
means for a proposition to be true as a matter of law.

IV.

AN EVALUATION

Patterson's book is one of the best works in recent years in the
philosophy of law. It is a groundbreaking effort to develop the implications of the concept of truth in law. He offers a very important theory as to what it means to say that propositions of law are true or false.
Indeed, in my view, he has offered the most sophisticated non-realist
account of truth in law that is presently available. Every legal philosopher has much to learn from Patterson. Despite this, I am not
persuaded.
I believe that Patterson's project should be rejected because (1)
Patterson's rejection of the realist account of truth is not persuasive;
(2) Patterson's positive account of truth in law is unacceptable; (3)
Patterson's contention that external forms of legal justification are irrelevant has no merit; (4) Patterson's purported descriptive project in
jurisprudence is actually a proposal to reform the system and does not
differ significantly from externalist approaches 78 in law; and (5) Pat[T]otal science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in
the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of
our statements. Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of
others, because of their logical interconnections-the logical laws being in
turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field.

Id. at 42.
72 See PATIMRSON, supra note 1, at 172; QuiNE, supra note 71, at 43 ("it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement").

73 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 172.
74
75
76
77
78
notes

Id
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
For more on external versus internal approaches in jurisprudence, see infra
122-27 and accompanying text.
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terson's solution to the problem of conflict among the forms of legal
argument is unsatisfactory.
A.

A Critique of Patterson'sRejection of the Realist Account of Truth

For Patterson, a major problem for any realist account of truth is
to illumine the way that the word and world hook up. 79 He uses
Michael Moore as an example of a realist. 80 He believes Moore has

offered the best defense of a natural law realist theory in law. 81 For
Moore, a legal proposition is true when the proposition corresponds
to the way the world is-in other words, a state of affairs independent

of the mind.8 2 Patterson raises a central problem for the realist: how
does the world guide our usage? 83 He contends that the realist can-

not show how truth is a function of the way the world is. 84 Instead, the
realist ends up showing that truth is a function of beliefs-the realist
is unable to get outside of beliefs or language to the world.85 For
example, Moore turns out to advocate a coherence epistemology. 8 6
According to a coherence theory, 'justification of any belief is a matter of cohering that belief with everything else we believe." 87 Patterson contends this coherence approach fails to show how word and
79 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 11; see also MAu'AS, supra note 11. Malpas observes that the philosopher P.F. Strawson argued that one could not elucidate the
notion of truth in terms of any correspondence between statements and facts. Id. at
240. This is because moving from discourse of truth to discourse of correspondence
only shifts the focus for the debate. Id. at 241. Instead of"what is truth?" the question
becomes "what is correspondence." Id.
80 See PArERSON, supra note 1, at 43.
81 Id. at 44.
82 Id. at 44-46.
83 Id. at 10.
84 Id.; see also RORTy, supra note 3, at 6 (antirepresentationaists contend that
there is "no way of formulating an independent test of accuracy of representation-of
reference or correspondence to an 'antecedently determinate' reality").
85 See PATTERSON, supranote 1, at 10; see also RORTY, supra note 3, at 9 (questioning whether there is anything "which might lift us out of our beliefs to a standpoint
from which we glimpse the relations of those beliefs to reality").
86 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 10.
87 Id. (quoting Michael S. Moore, Precedent,Induction, andEthical Generalization,in
PRECEDENT IN LAW 183, 198 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987)); cf BARUCH A. BRODY,
BEGINNING PHILOSOPHY (1977). Brody writes:
For the idealists, one acquired understanding only when one could fit that
which is understood into some comprehensive, coherent, and integrated system. In that way, the truth is one indivisible whole. An individual belief
would be true only insofar as it would fit into (cohere with) such an ideal
system.
Id. at 197.
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world connect. 88 Instead of showing how the world makes propositions true, the coherence theory directs us to other beliefs and not to
the way the world is.9 We are unable to get outside the circle of beliefs to the world. Thus, Moore has not shown how the world makes
what we say true or false.9 0
To evaluate Patterson's argument, it is helpful to locate it within
the general philosophical attack on realism. Patterson's argument is a
version of probably the most familiar criticism of a realist conception
of truth.91 It is usually directed against correspondence theories of
truth. 9 2 The argument proceeds as follows. On the realist account, in
order to determine whether a proposition is true, one would have to
determine whether it corresponds to some fact or the world in an
appropriate way.93 The argument contends, however, that this is impossible. 94 One cannot get outside one's beliefs or discourse in order
to view reality or the world itself.9 5 All of one's cognition of the world
is mediated by our beliefs. 96 Thus, one cannot get at the world or
97
reality to see how our beliefs or statements link up to the world.
One is unable to get outside the circle of our beliefs. 98
In my view this is what Patterson means by saying that the central
problem for realism is that it cannot show how the word and the world
hook up. For Patterson, the realist cannot show how the world can
88

See

89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id.

93

Id. at 86.

PATTERSON,

supra note 1, at 11.

See ALSTON, supra note 25, at 85.

94 Id.; see also Carl G. Hempel, On the LogicalPositivists' Theory of Truth, 2 ANALYsis
49 (1935). In formulating a version of this argument, Hempel writes:
Each statement may be combined or compared with each other statement,

e.g., in order to draw conclusions from the combined statements, or to see if
they are compatible with each other or not. But statements are never com-

pared with a 'reality,' with 'facts.' None of those who support a cleavage
between statements and reality is able to give a precise account of how a
comparison between statements and facts may possibly be accomplished,
and how we may possibly ascertain the structure of facts.
Id at 50-51.
95 See AiSTON, supra note 25, at 86.

96 Id
97 Id.
98 Id.; see also MICHAEL WLiAMs,

GROUNDLmSS BELIEF

112 (1977) ("[J]ustification

is a matter of accommodating beliefs that are being questioned to a body of accepted

beliefs. Justification always terminates with other beliefs and not with our confronting
'raw chunks of reality,' for that idea is incoherent.").
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make propositions true or false because the realist, like Moore, cannot
get outside the circle of beliefs.
In light of this argument, one can perhaps better understand
what motivates Patterson's project. Patterson's rejection of a realist
account of truth in law may be viewed as an attempt to bring truth
down to earth. His approach seeks to link truth to human desires,
beliefs and the use of language. He rejects the philosophical tradition
that has viewed truth as correspondence between thought and a supposedly inaccessible reality. Other philosophers also have rejected
that tradition. 99 They have done so in the belief that the traditional
conception of truth was designed to promote the view that philosophers have a special method for ascertaining truth.1 0 0 They sought
instead to ensure that the realm of truth could be brought within the
scope of human powers. 0 1
Under these circumstances, noble motives may underlie Patterson's argument against a realist account of truth. Despite this, his argument is subject to a powerful response. Even if the argument's
claims are true, they have no force against a realist conception of
truth. 10 2 This is because a realist account purports to describe what
truth is-it does not attempt to provide a way to determine what is
true and what is false. 10 3 Thus, Patterson's central argument against a
realist account of truth in law can do no damage because the realist
has always maintained that truth is independent of our beliefs or our
10 4
ability to learn the truth.
99

See Donald Davidson, The Structure and Content of Truth, 87J. PHIL. 279 (1990).

100 See id. at 279; see alsOJoHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (Dover Publications
1958). Dewey writes:
[T]he profuseness of attestations to supreme devotion to truth on the part
of philosophy is a matter to arouse suspicion. For it has usually been a preliminary to the claim of being a peculiar organ of access to highest and ultimate truth. Such it is not .... Truth is a collection of truths; and these
constituent truths are in the keeping of the best available methods of inquiry
and testing as to matters-of-fact; methods which are, when collected under a
single name, science. As to truth, then, philosophy has no pre-eminent
status.
Id. at 410.

101 See Davidson, supra note 99, at 280.
102 See ALsTON, supra note 25, at 86.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 86-87; see also Davidson, supra note 99. Davidson also rejects the usual

complaint against correspondence theories of truth-i.e., that it is impossible to compare one's words or beliefs with the world. He rejects this argument because it depends on assuming that some form of epistemic theory of truth is correct and the

realist can simply reply that truth is independent of our beliefs or our ability to learn
the truth. Id. at 302-03.
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B. A Critique of Patterson'sAccount of Truth in Law
As part of his postmodernjurisprudence, Patterson asserts that to
say that a propositon is true is to say that "a sufficiently well placed
speaker who used the words in that way would be fully warranted in
counting the statement as true of that situation." 05 Thus, for Patterson a proposition of law is true if a competent legal actor could justify
06
its assertion.
This view seems to identify truth with justification, in that a statement is true if its assertion would be justified. Indeed, Patterson has
said that "there is nothing more to be said about the truth of a propo10 7
sition of law than advancing the reasons for its assertion.
To the extent that Patterson's project identifies truth with justification, significant problems arise. "Truth cannot simply be justification. . . ."108 This is because (1) "truth is supposed to be a property of

a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost"; and
(2) "justification is a matter of degree whereas truth is not." 0 9 To
identify truth with justification would require us "to give up the principle that some of the statements which are now justified may turn out
11
not to be true."11 0 This result would be unacceptable.'
It may be that Patterson is seeking to offer a notion of truth as
idealized justified assertability. The fact that he defines truth by refering to a "sufficiently well placed speaker" may indicate this view. This
would be an epistemic 12 conception of truth. 113 For example, Hilary
Putnam-the philosopher who seems to have most influenced Patterson in his account of truth in law-at one time argued that a statement is true if it would be justified under epistemically ideal
conditions-or in a situation in which all relevant evidence is readily
105
AND

See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 151 (quoting
P, sArrv 115 (1988)).

Hn.ARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION

106 Id. at 151-52.
107 Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction ofLegal Theory, 72 Tax. L. REv. 1, 56 (1993); see also KnuuAM, supra note 2, at 49
("Some philosophers ... have claimed that truth must be defined or analyzed in terms

ofjustification or one of its near synonyms, such as warranted assertibility.").
108

Hn-ARY PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 84 (emphasis omitted); see also ALSTON, supra

note 25, at 192 ("the first thing to notice is the impossibility of supposing that a belief's beingjustified, as we ordinarily think of this, is sufficient for, much less identical
with, its being true").
109 See PuTNAM, supra note 3, at 84.
110 Id. at 85.
111 Id.
112 Epistemic conceptions of truth identify truth with some favorable epistemic
status.

113 See ALSTON, supra note 25, at 188.
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available. 114 If this is the sort of theory that Patterson has in mind,
then it is subject to other serious objections. At the outset, there are
major problems in attempting to work out a plausible concept of an
ideal epistemic situation. 115 Moreover, there are counter examples to
the ideal justifiability conception of truth. In this regard, it is plausible to suppose that there are propositions that are true but not ideally
justifiable. 1 6 There may be states of affairs or aspects of reality that
are totally inaccessible to human cognition.11 7 If so, propositions asserting that such states of affairs obtain will be true even though no
statements bearing those propositions as their content would be justifiable in an epistemically ideal situation. 18 Given this, truth cannot
be defined as justifiability for human beings in the most ideal situation possible for us." 9
Epistemic theories of truth have other problems. Theorists, like
Putnam, seek to tie truth to the actual ability of human beings to recognize that certain conditions are satisfied. 120 This presents a major
difficulty. Such theorists cannot explain how idealized justified assertability can be both a fixed property-or something that cannot be
lost-and a property that depends on the actual ability of human
speakers to recognize that certain conditions are satisfied. Such a view
cannot explain this because actual abilities differ from person to person whereas truth does not. Epistemic theories of truth, then, by limiting truth to what can be ascertained, deprive truth of its role as an
intersubjective standard. 12 ' Thus, Patterson's account of truth in law
cannot work even if it is based on the epistemic notion of truth as
ideal justified assertability.
C. A Critique of Patterson'sRejection of ExternalApproaches
inJurisprudence
Contemporary legal theorists have identified an external point of
view which has dominated approaches to constitutional adjudication. 2 2 External legal theorists seek to discover principles for legal
114

truth
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 189, 194; see also PUTNAM, supra note 3, at xvii ("My own view ...is that

is to be identified with justification in the sense of idealizedjustification.").
See ALSTON, supra note 25, at 197.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
See Davidson, supra note 99, at 307.
Id. at 308-09.
See, e.g., Lind, supra note 38, at 356; see also ErnestJ. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:

On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). Weinrib observes that the
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decisionmaking that are external to judicial practice and outside of
law. 123 Thus, the picture of legal justification that external theorists
offer is that the truth of a legal proposition is a function of something
that goes beyond law. 124 External theorists, then, have sought to evaluate legal practice on the basis of criteria external to that practicefor example, principles and methods from such disciplines as philoso2-5
phy, literary criticism or economics.
In constrast to external approaches, some theorists recommend
an internalist point of view. From an internalist perspective, adjudication stands independently of externalist theory.' 26 According to the
internal account, there is no way to evaluate legal decision except by
internal investigation of judicial practice.' 2 7 One who takes the internalist approach studies the practice of a craft to ascertain and describe the interpretive methods and linguistic conventions used by the
28
practitioners.
Patterson advocates an internalist approach and rejects appealing
to matters external to law to justify legal propositions. 12 9 He rejects
external approaches-appeals to philosophy, literary theory or economics-not because extemalist theory is wrong, but because it is irrelevant.' 3 0 According to Patterson, illegitimacy in legal justification
results from the use of justificatory tools of disciplines external to
law.11
What does it mean for Patterson to contend that externalist theory is irrelevant? The roots of this argument, I believe, lie deep in
Patterson's Wittgensteinian background. To understand Patterson's
point, and to construct an argument against his position, it is helpful
to consider the conflict between ideal language philosophers and ordominant tendency is to look upon the content of law from the standpoint of some
external ideals that the law is to enforce. He contends that implicit in contemporary
legal scholarship is the idea that law embodies or should embody some goal that can
be specified apart from law and can serve as the standard by which law is to be evaluated. Id at 955.
123 See Lind, supra note 38, at 370.
124

See Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, supra note 23, at 281.

125 See Lind, supra note 38, at 359, 370-71.
126 Id. at 357.
127 Id.; see also Bobbitt, supranote 31, at 1902 (arguing that "the meaning of legal
practices inheres in the practices themselves, and accordingly that understanding is a
matter of mastering the activities that comprise those practices").
128 See Lind, supra note 38, at 359.
129 See PATT-RSON, supra note 1, at 137.
130 Id.

131 Id. at 148.
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dinary language philosophers-a conflict that evolved under the
shadow of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
In the wake of Wittgenstein, philosophers took the Linguistic
Turn. 3 2 According to the linguistic philosophers, philosophical
problems could be solved or dissolved either by reforming language
or by understanding more about ordinary language.' 38 In philosophy,
two opposing schools developed: ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. 3 4 The ideal language philosophers suggested that it would be possible to eliminate philosophical problems
not by describing our ordinary language but by constructing an ideal
language. 13 5 In contrast to the ideal language philosopher, ordinary
language philosophers-under the strong influence of the later
Wittgenstein-took the linguistic turn but refused to construct an
ideal language.' 36 They argued that philosophical problems arise because philosophers have not used ordinary English.' 37 Accordingly,
ordinary language philosophers adopted as their method the description of the logical behavior of the linguistic expressions of ordinary
language.' 38 In so doing, philosophical problems could be dissolved.
The dispute between the ordinary language philosophers and the
ideal language philosophers is analogous to the dispute between internalist versus externalist theorists in law. Ordinary language philosophers may be viewed as internalists; ideal language philosophers as
externalists. The ordinary language philosophers argued that since
philosophical questions arise in ordinary language, one ought to be
able to resolve philosophical problems in ordinary language without
132 See generally THE LINGUISTIC TURN: RECENT ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
(Richard Rorty ed., 1967) [hereinafter LINGUISTIC TURN] (explaining movement away
from Wittgensteinian scientific evaluation of philosophical theories to more language
oriented approach).
133 See id. at 3; see also THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP (Paul A. Schilpp ed.,
1963) (observing that the aim of both naturalists and constructivists was to solve philosophical problems); Gustav Bergmann, Logical Positivism, Language and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics, in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 132, at 63 (discussing group of
philosophers who have taken the linguistic turn initiated by Wittgenstein).
134 SeeBergmann, supranote 133, at 64 (discussing division between ideal linguists
and analysts of ordinary usage); LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 132, at 4.
135 See Bergmann, supra note 133, at 65-66.
136 SeeJ.O. Urmson, The History of PhilosophicalAnalysis, in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra
note 132, at 294. Urmson observes that the ordinary language philosophers were
inspired by the thought of the later Wittgenstein. Id. at 297. He states that Wittgenstein did not believe that the use of an ideal language would be helpful in philosophical analysis. Id.; LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 132, at 12.
137 SeeJames W. Cornman, Uses of Languageand PhilosophicaIProblens, in LINGUISTIC
TURN, supra note 132, at 227.
138 See LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 132, at 19.
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having to appeal to some external discourse-namely, some ideal language. Thus a key argument in favor of the ordinary language approach went as follows:13 9 "[T] he roots of philosophical problems lie
in ordinary language . . . [therefore,] the difficulties must be eliminated by the analysis of ordinary language."' 40 To seek to resolve
these difficulties by appealing to some external discourse-such as an
ideal or constructed language-would be to do something totally irrelevant. 141 It would direct our attention from the original problems
to different concepts.1 42
This argument explains what Patterson and other theorists mean
when they say that external theory is irrelevant. It is analogous to arguments offered against externalist approaches in law. Douglas Lind,
for example, offers such an argument against externalist views in law.
Lind argues that external legal theorists allow for determination of
legal meaning to take place wholly independent of the practice of adjudication. 143 According to an internalist approach to law, however,
the practice of adjudication provides the only authoritative standard
of constitutional meaning.'4 Lind, therefore, contends that since external theorists base constitutional meaning on standards which lie
outside the practice of adjudication, they issue judgments of constitutional right and wrong which are fundamentally irrelevant. 145 Thus,
just as the proposals of ideal language philosophers to reconstruct language were said to be fundamentally irrelevant, in that they direct our
attention away from the original concerns, so too are externalist proposals to reconstruct the practice of law.
With respect to the argument that externalist accounts are irrelevant in law, one can construct a response analogous to the ideal language philosophers' response to the ordinary language argument
described above. Rudolf Carnap, one of the major ideal language philosophers, 14 argued against the ordinary language approach and emphasized the importance of the introduction of new linguistic
139 See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 133, at 937.
140 Id. at 937-38.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Lind, supra note 38, at 390.
144 Id.
145 Seeid.
146 See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supranote 133, at xv. For recent reappraisals of Camap's philosophy, see Guy S. Axtell, In the Tracks of the Historicist Movement: Reassessing the Carnap-Kuhn Connection, 24 STUD. HAsr. PHim. Sci. 119 (1993);
Michael Friedman, Carnap'sAujbau Reconsidered, 21 Nous 521 (1987); Michael Friedman, The Re-evaluation of Logical Positivism, 88 J. PHIL. 505 (1991); George A. Reisch,
Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricim?, 58 PHL.Sci. 264 (1991).
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frameworks or conceptual schemes in order to resolve philosophical
problems. 147 Carnap said that the ordinary language argument is
based on the view that ordinary language is something that cannot be
changed or replaced.' 48 Contrary to the ordinary language philosophers, however, Carnap argued that a language is an instrument that
may be replaced or modified according to our needs, like any other
instrument. 149 Language is something we have learned. Therefore
we can replace it with another language. 15 0 Carnap said that ordinary
language is like a crude pocket knife. It may be useful for certain
purposes. For some purposes, however, special tools are more efficient. 15 1 Thus, if the pocket knife is too crude, we should replace it
with a more suitable tool. 1 52 According to Carnap, the ordinary language philosophers were in essence arguing that we should not use a
special tool-ideal language-because by doing so we evade the problem of the correct use of the cruder tool-ordinary language.153 In
Carnap's view, however, that argument is not persuasive-we should
not criticize someone for using a more sophisticated tool-ideal language-to solve problems that a more primitive tool-ordinary language-could not resolve. 54 Thus, Camap concluded that the choice
of a method for the solution of philosophical problems-an ideal language approach versus ordinary language approach-should be decided by practical considerations. 15 5
We are now in a position to construct an argument against Patterson's claim that externalist accounts in law are irrelevant. The argument is analogous to Carnap's argument against the ordinary
language philosophers. Our current forms of legal argumentation
147 See Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, in LINGUISTIc TURN, supra
note 132, at 72.
148

See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 133, at 938.

149 Id. at 938-39; see also Reisch, supra note 146, at 275 (value of linguistic
frameworks resides in their utility with respect to practical purposes).
150

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 133, at 938.

151 Id. at 938-39.
152 Id. at 939; see also Reisch, supra note 146, at 275 (noting that Carnap argued
that philosophical instruments may prove useless and become extinct).
153

See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF

CARNAl,

supra note 133, at 939.

154 Id.
155 Id.; Reisch, supranote 146, at 274. Carnap's principle of tolerance-that is, the
freedom to adopt linguistic forms according to one's purposes-ensures that there is
no one ideal philosophical model of scientific theory. Instead, various philosophical
goals will generate species of philosophical instruments. Id. at 274. These instruments will each be intended to clarify and reconstruct scientific reasoning for a particular set of purposes. Id. at 274-75. Just as organic species may become more fit in
their respective niches, these philosophical instruments may become more fruitful in
fulfilling their purposes. Id. at 275.
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may be too crude a tool. If externalist forms of legal justification-or
appeals to philosophy, literary theory or economics-would be a more
helpful instrument, then we should attempt to construct such
schemes to resolve practical problems in society. We should not set
up dogmatic prohibitions against externalist accounts in law. The
choice of a method for the solution of jurisprudential problems-internal versus external approaches-should be decided by practical
considerations.
Consider an example. In 1963 Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed
to external theory-natural law' 5 6-in an effort to justify his disobedience to the segregationist statutes then existing in the southern portion of the United States. 15 7 In his famous "Letter from Birmingham
Jail," King argued that the segregation statutes could not be law because they were unjust and contrary to natural law. 158 This example
shows how external forms ofjustification in law might be useful-they
might help bring about racial justice. In view of their success it seems
that one should not take the position that external forms ofjustification in law are irrelevant.
D. A Critique of Pattersonon Jurisprudence and Description:
InternalistApproaches Collapse into Externalist Approaches
Patterson suggests that the task of jurisprudence is simply to describe the internal forms of legal argument. 15 9 This is consistent with
the opening page of Law and Truth, which cites Ludwig Wittgenstein's
famous dictum that philosophy can only describe the actual use of
language, and philosophy leaves everything as it is.160 Wittgenstein
took the position that philosophy was purely descriptive. 16 ' Patter156 Internalist legal theorists have uniformly taken the position that natural law is
an illegitimate externalist approach. For example, Bobbitt rejects the view that natural law is enshrined in the Constitution. See BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 168 (arguing
that the United States Constitution "refus~es] to enshrine any particular comprehensive morality"). Similarly, Lind states that the Supreme Court does not engage in
externalist inquiry into abstract principles of higher law. See Lind, supra note 38, at
386.
157 See PHILosoPHIcAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW 24 (David M. Adams ed., 1992).
158 See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail in PHrLosopHcAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW 58-62 (David M. Adams ed., 1992). For a recent discussion of
natural law, see LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUsTICE (1987).
159 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 137; see also Patterson, supra note 107, at 56
("The task ofjurisprudence is the accurate description of the forms of argument used
by lawyers to show the truth of propositions of law.").
160 See PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein).
161 See P.M.S. HACxER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION 117 (1972); see also PAUL JOHNSTON,
WrITGENSTEIN AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1989). Johnston observes that the fundamen-
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son's descriptive project cannot succeed, however, because any neoWittgensteinian purported descriptions of our ordinary methods of
legal argument are actually disguised reformations of our legal practices. Accordingly, Patterson's purported internalist descriptive project differs only in degree from externalist approaches.
To see this, consider the view of Douglas Lind, a neo-Wittgen62
steinian who has offered a view similar to Patterson and Bobbitt.1
Lind argues that there is no way to evaluate legal decisionmaking except by internal investigation ofjudicial practice. 63 Thus, Lind seeks
to ascertain and describe the conventions actually employed by the
practitioners of adjudication.1 6 4 According to Lind, his internal investigation of constitutional adjudicative practice reveals that judicial decisions are justified to the extent that they satisfy the internal
conditions of adjudicative excellence-impartiality, reasoned explanation, articulative boundaries, coherence and workability. 65 Like Bobbitt and Patterson, Lind purports to describe adjudicative practice.
Yet Lind has identified different modalities from those described by
Bobbitt 166 and adopted by Patterson. So it seems that Patterson and
his allies are not able to simply describe modalities which would then
be used to justify legal propositions. Contrary to Wittgenstein's dictum, they cannot leave everything as it is. Patterson and his allies are
actually proposing that our legal practice could be reconstructed
along the lines of their suggested modalities. Such modalities would
then be used to justify legal propositions. Under these circumstances,
Patterson's descriptive project seems to differ only in degree from the
externalist approaches to jurisprudence-approaches that appeal to
philosophy, economics or literary theory-which may also be viewed
as attempts to reconstruct our legal practice by offering external ways
of justifying legal propositions.
E. A Critique of Patterson'sSolution to the Problem
of Conflict Among Modalities
What happens when the modalities or the forms of legal argument conflict? Patterson recognizes that the modalities can be used
tal premise underlying Wittgenstein's method is the claim that philosophy should be
descriptive, and that it should advance no theses. Id. at 2.
162 See Lind, supra note 38, at 353-71.
163 Id. at 357.
164 Id. at 359.
165 Id. at 378.
166 For a description of Bobbitt's modalities, see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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to generate different outcomes. 16 7 He resolves this problem by suggesting that one ought to select the modality that best coheres with
other beliefs-in other words, select the proposition that best hangs
together with everything else we take to be true. 16 8 This coherence
theory is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of conflict among
the forms of argument. It generates the problem of bad coherence in
our legal institutions. 6 9 Coherence theories give rise to a difficulty: it
is possible to have a coherent system of belief and have that system be
coherently bad. 170 For example, racist or sexist systems can be coherently bad. 17' Thus, in selecting a form of legal argument that best
coheres with everything else we take to be true, it is possible to select
one that would support a legal proposition that could be bad-racist
or sexist, for example. Pessy v. Ferguson'7 2 is instructive on this point
At the time that Pessy was decided, the racist proposition expressed by
that decision-the idea that segregation of racial minorities was permissible-cohered well with its contemporary legal and political context.- 7 3 Given the possibility of bad coherence, Patterson's Quinean
solution to the problem of conflicting modalities is simply
unacceptable.
V.

THE MovE TowARD REALISM

If antirealist or antirepresentationalist accounts of truth are not
acceptable, what is the alternative? It seems to me that the realist alternative has not yet been defeated. Patterson's book may end up performing a very valuable service by spurring legal philosophers to
produce better realist accounts of truth in law. Such work is needed
and would be consistent with the recent revival of realism in other
167

See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 172. Recently, pragmatists, critical legal schol-

ars and others have argued that law is indeterminate in the sense that legal materials
often permit a judge to justify multiple outcomes to lawsuits. See, e.g., RiCHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENcE 23 (1990) ("Moreover, the American legal
tradition is now so rich, variegated, conflicted and ambivalent that a strand of it can
easily be found to support either side in difficult cases."); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HAuv. L. R~v. 1685 (1976) (describing how
law is infused with irreconcilably opposed principles and ideals); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1, 11-12 (1984)
(stating traditional legal theory incorporates indeterminacy).
168 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 172.
169 See MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699,
1710 (1990).

170 Id.
171

Id.

172 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
173

See Radin, supra note 169, at 1723.
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areas of philosophy such as in the philosophy of science and ethics. 174
For example, philosophers have recently published some major defenses of moral realism. 175 This work on moral realism is highly significant since moral realism is closely linked to realism in law. For
instance, Michael Moore's realist account of truth in law contends
that the truth of a legal proposition in law depends on a true moral
177
proposition. 176 Thus, for Moore, the legal realist is a moral realist.
Given the importance of moral realism for law, it is worth briefly
sketching the general philosophical trend toward realism, including
moral realism. Recent developments in realist philosophy of science
and related naturalistic developments in epistemology and philosophy
of language can be used to defend moral realism.17 8 Philosophers'
increasing inclination to view science from a realist perspective 179 has
brought about advances in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language that suggest a realist conception of the main issues
in the philosophy of science. 180 These developments represent an effort to explore the philosophical implications of the realist position
that reality is prior to thought.' 8 ' These results establish realism as a
plausible philosophical position and make possible a serious defense
of moral realism. 182 Given these recent developments in philosophy,
there is reason to believe that a realist account of truth in law will
prove to be persuasive.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Law and Truth is one of the most significant books on jurisprudence to be published in recent years. It constitutes a pioneering effort to carefully explore the importance of an account of truth for law.
In so doing Patterson has produced the most sophisticated non-realist
theory of truth in law that is presently available. In spite of his masterful effort, I believe Patterson's rejection of realism must ultimately fail.
174 See Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a MoralRealist, in EssAys ON MORAL REALISM 181
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988).
175 See, e.g., id.; David Brink, Moral Realism and the Skeptical Argumentsfrom Disagreement and Queerness, 62 AUSTRALASLANJ. OF PHIL. 111 (1984); Peter Railton, MoralRealism, 95 PHn.

REv. 163 (1986).

176 See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 44.
177 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turnfor the Worse,
41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 882 (1989).
178

See Boyd, supra note 174, at 182.

179
180
181
182

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
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Instead, the recent revival of realism in philosophy may offer important direction for jurisprudence in years to come.

